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Proxy Fight Expenditures of
Insurgent Shareholders
Leonard S. Machtinger
In setting forth his opinion that proxy fights are an expensive, yet
vital, aspect of corporate existence, the author argues for corporate reimbursement of both insurgents and management for proxy light expenditures. Initially, Mr. Machtinger discusses the factors upon which a decision to allow reimbursement must be predicated, and laments that
presently many insurgents are not able to obtain adequatereimbursement.
The author points out that insurgents, under certain circumstances, are
permitted to deduct proxy fight expenditures from their gross income
under federal income tax law. While the deduction allowance is not
equivalent to total corporate reimbursement, it is concluded that such tax
allowances are presently the best aid to insurgents performing the desirable function of challenging corporate management.

COUNTERACT the progressive divorcement of corporate
ownership from corporate management,' shareholders have
been encouraged by the States and by Congress to participate in the
corporate electoral process in order to fashion corporation policies
and to select directors who will
best represent their interests.
0
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Such encouragement has been
evidenced by the States in the
formulation of their corporation laws' and by Congress in

the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
While shareholder participation in the formation of corporate policy is considered to be desirable,4 few shareholders have
1 For a thorough study of the separation of ownership and control, see A. BERLE &
G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211-12, 219, 222, 224 (West 1953); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 601-03, 605, 608-09, 614-16 (McKinney 1963); see Note, Proxy
Fight Expenses: Problems of Tax Deduction, 43 VA. L. REV. 891, 913 (1957).
3 5 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934):
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened
not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the
major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934): "Fair corporate suffrage
is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange."
4 See, e.g., Latcham & Emerson, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy, 4 W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1952).
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attempted to challenge the management responsible for the policies.
During the fiscal years 1956-1966, 26,152 proxy solicitation statements were filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, but
only 272 contests for the election of directors occurred during the
same period. Of these contests, 168 were for control of the board
of directors and 104 were for representation on the 'board, with
management winning nearly three-fifths of the contests.' In recent
years, it has become apparent that the use of a proxy contest to gain
control of a corporation is being replaced by the use of an offer to
shareholders to purchase their shares at a price above the market.6
Such an offer is likely to be much simpler and involve less disclosure and less expense than a proxy contest for control,7 and, in the
event that the offeror is unsuccessful, a large percentage of the funds
expended in purchasing the shares can usually be recovered in subsequent sales by the offeror.'
I.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A PROXY FIGHT

Although shareholders are encouraged to press their views before the corporate electorate, a major obstacle preventing them from
challenging management in a proxy contest is the high cost of such
a challenge.9 For example, the 1954 New York Central Railroad
proxy fight cost both sides a total of $2,159,000;1o in the 1955
Montgomery Ward battle management spent $766,000;" in a 1964
proxy solicitation one faction spent $365,000;12 in the recent M-G-M
proxy fight, management's known and estimated expenses amounted
to $125,000 and the insurgent's were $175,000."
While these
amounts may be exceptionally high because of the size of the com622-32 SEC ANN. Rmz. (1956-1966).
0
Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchasesof Stock, 22 Bus. LAW.
149 (1966); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 317 (1967); N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1965, § 3 (Financial), at 2, col. 3.
7 N.Y. Times, supra note 6.
8 In 1965, ,for instance, 44 cash tender offers to acquire control were reported involving companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. In contrast, only eight cash tender offers were made in 1960. Cohen, supra
note 6; see Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 6; Investment Dealers' Digest - Corporate Financing Directory, Feb. 6, 1967, at 71-72; id., Aug. 15, 1966, at 78-79.
9 Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. Rnv. 950, 951
(1951).
30 Note, supra note 2.
111d.
12

Republic Corporation 1965 Proxy Statement, Securities and Exchange Commission File # 1-3286-2-6.
13 Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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panies involved and the intensity with which the battles were fought,
proxy fights are usually costly.14
A.

Reimbursement of Management

Furthermore, in a battle between management and an insurgent
shareholder group, management has substantial financial advantages
because it can charge its proxy fight expenses to the corporate treasury, 1 while the insurgents must use their own funds. Management
enjoys this advantage because the board of directors has a duty to
inform the shareholders of its decisions and the reasons for them.
Since the shareholders are the owners of the corporation, they have
a right to know the nature of the action taken by their elected representatives, and it is only fair to charge the corporation, rather
than the directors, for the cost of this informative process. Therefore, inasmuch as such information is an aid to intelligent decisionmaking by the shareholders, it does not seem to be inequitable to
charge the shareholders indirectly, through the corporate treasury,
for this service."8
Nevertheless, reimbursement should be limited to only those
expenses necessary to the informational process. It is clear that
management may charge to the corporation mailing expenses and
other expenses attendant upon preparation of proxy soliciting materials.1 7 However, the propriety of charging the corporation for
advertising and public relations expenditures incurred in a proxy
solicitation is not so clear.'" While it can be argued that advertising
is justified if the shareholders reside throughout the country, 9 it
seems unlikely that advertisements would more adequately inform
the shareholders than would materials dealing with the issues in detail mailed directly to them.
14

E . ARANOW & H. EINlORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 487
(1957); Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty, 41
CALIF. L. REv. 393,435 (1953); Friedman, supra note 9, at 951.
15See, e.g., Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 114-15, afld
sub nom. Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yard Co., 337
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964).
16 Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (Ch.
1934).
17 Appeal Printing Co. v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 128 N.Y.L.J. 1563 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1953); see Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
18 For two early cases discussing proxy solicitation expenses, see Rascovor v. American Linseed Co., 135 F. 341 (2d Cir. 1905) and Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated
Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907).
19 E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 14, at 504.

19681

PROXY FIGHT EXPENDITURES

It is questionable whether certain types of expenditures should
be charged to the corporation under any circumstances. For example, payments for the services of proxy solicitors should not be allowed because such services go beyond merely informing the shareholder of corporate issues and put pressure on shareholders in order
to obtain proxies for the management faction."0 Similarly, the
expense of last-minute telegrams and telephone calls should fall on
management and not on the corporation. 2 Management's duty to
inform the shareholders is fully performed by the use of mailed communications;2" other contacts with shareholders should be paid for
by management personally. However, if it is likely that without
the use of extraordinary methods, such as the employment of professional proxy solicitors, telephone calls, and telegrams, a quorum will
not be present at a shareholder meeting or that a sufficient number
of shareholders will not be present to approve matters requiring a
high percentage of votes, the cost of these extraordinary methods
should be chargeable to the corporate treasury.23
At present there are no real restrictions on proxy fight expenditures by management, aside from the requirement that all expenditures charged to the corporation must be reasonable in amount.24
But, lipservice is usually paid to an alleged distinction between personal and policy contests - that is, directors may charge the corporate treasury for proxy solicitation expenses only if the proxy contest
is concerned with issues of policy rather than personal control.25
The distinction, however, is meaningless, for personal ambitions to
obtain or retain control of a corporation and the company's business
policies are usually inextricably intertwined.V The court in Hall v.
Trans-Lux DaylightPictureScreen Corp." noted that:
It does not appear to me to be tenable to say that when the formal
issue is whether or not certain persons shall be elected, it must be
20

Latcham & Emerson, supra note 4, at 11. But see In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181

(Sup. C. 1947).
2

1 Emerson & Latcham, Further Insight into More Effective Stockholder Participation: The Sparks-Withingtoo Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429, 445-49, 451-52 (1951).
22
Friedman, supra note 9, at 954.
23 Id.; Latcham & Emerson, supra note 4, at 13.
24
Cullom v. Simmonds, 285 App. Div. 1051, 139 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1955); McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.LJ. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd nzem. sub nom. Blum v. Segal,
277 App. Div. 963, 99 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1950).
25
See notes 15 & 18 supra.
2
6 McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.Lj. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem. su nom.
Blum v. Segal, 277 App. Div. 963, 99 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1950); Friedman, supra note 9, at
952; Note, supra note 2, at 893.
2720 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (Ch. 1934).
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conclusively considered that no question of policy is involved, that
only the personal interests or ambitions of individuals are at stake
and that therefore no corporate funds may be expended in furtherance of one side to the contest. A question of policy which concerns very intimately the future of the corporate business may turn
upon the particular personnel of the directors and officers. Indeed
it often happens in practice as it necessarily must that questions of
policy come up not as abstract propositions which are referred to
the stockholders for a yes and no vote, but in the form of whether
the directors
who stand for the given policy shall be re-elected to
28
office
To allow management access to the corporate treasury to defend

itself is advisable for several reasons. If incumbent management
were compelled to rely on their own financial resources in a proxy
contest, many corporations would be at the mercy of any person or
group with sufficient funds to conduct a proxy fight for control.
The members of management often may not personally possess the
necessary funds to conduct a proxy solicitation or may not want to
risk their personal fortunes on the uncertain outcome of a proxy
fight. However, a contested proxy solicitation between persons
possessing equally adequate funds is an effective way to alert shareholders to the consequences of a change in control, to inform them
of the experience, qualifications, and views of the nominees for directorships, and to acquaint them with the business and financial
condition of the enterprise. Such information will not only aid
the shareholder in judging the performance of the incumbent managers and in choosing between the management and insurgent
slates, but will also assist him in determining the true value of his
investment, the company's prospects for the future, and the desirability of holding or selling his shares. These benefits accrue
whether the contest involves an issue of fundamental corporate policy or is merely a struggle for power between two factions. Therefore, management access to the corporate treasury for necessary
expenses should be permitted in any proxy fight.
B.

Reimbursement of Lnsurgents

Since the possibility of having to defend itself in a proxy fight
is often likely to cause management to act with exceeding care and
consideration, the company's coffers should also be available to
finance the expenditures of insurgents. 29 Reimbursement would
2

81d. at 84, 171 A. at 228; accord, Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950).
29 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Friedman, supra note 9,
at 956. But see Note, Corporations:Proxy Solicitation and the Payment of Expenses
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greatly support the public policy of increasing shareholder participation in the affairs of the corporation because the financial burdens
of shareholder proxy challenges would be reduced substantially.
The ultimate result of allowing insurgents to use the corporate
treasury to finance proxy contests would be a better informed shareholder electorate. Such an electorate would be better able to make
intelligent and rational decisions because both sides of a corporate
issue would be presented to them for their consideration."0 As two
commentators have noted:
[I]f a corporate purpose is served by management's expenditure
of funds in order to explain and defend its position in a contest
involving "policy," then a similar corporate purpose is served by
reimbursing successful insurgents who incurred expenses in attacking and exposing management's record and "policy." In both cases
it may be argued that the corporate purpose served is that of informing the stockholders and bringing about an examination of
corporate policy and affairs, which thereby facilitate a more intelligent exercise of judgment on the part of better informed
stockholders. 3 '
Because the shareholders and the corporation benefit from the
elimination of unwanted policies, successful insurgents should be
reimbursed for the expenses incurred in ridding the corporation of
such policies. 2 Indeed, such repayment for the services rendered
by the insurgents should not require more than board approval.
But, in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airline Corp., 3 the court,
in approving reimbursement, gave considerable weight to shareholder ratification. However, if reimbursement had been lawful,
ratification would have been unnecessary, and if it had not been
lawful, which was not contended, then shareholder ratification
would have been of no avail.34
While the courts approve of reimbursing successful insurgents
because they rid the corporation of unwanted policies, the same rationale does not justify reimbursement of losing insurgents. Yet,
losing insurgents perform a valuable service for the corporation and
its shareholders by criticising management's activities, record, and
Incurred by Insurgent Stockholders Out of Corporation Funds, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 558,
563-64 (1951).
30 Friedman, supra note 9, at 958-59.
3
1 E. ARANOW & L EI-NHORN, supra note 14, at 512.
3
2 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
33 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 219 (1955).
3
4 See Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.
1952); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Super. Ct.
1952); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7,99 N.E. 138 (1912).
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proposals, and by offering alternatives to management's proposals
and personnel. The shareholders thus obtain more information on
which to render an intelligent decision and such informed decisionmaking redounds to the benefit of the corporation in the form of
wiser policies. Therefore, unsuccessful insurgents also should be
allowed reimbursement. 5 Indeed, it has been suggested that the
Securities and Exchange Commission amend its proxy rules, 6 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"r to require management to
reimburse unsuccessful opposition groups.38 However, such a proposal carries with it the risk of encouraging those who habitually
harass corporate managements to promote proxy fights. But this
undesirable effect could be remedied by requiring the losers to obtain a specified percentage of the total vote cast in order to merit
reimbursement. 9 The improbability of commanding the requisite
percentage would discourage all but those of serious intent from
engaging in proxy battles.
Without mandatory reimbursement for all insurgents, management has a decided advantage. If insurgents gain control of the
board of directors they can reimburse themselves, but if they lose a
contest for control or if a proxy fight does not involve control, the
insurgents must bear the entire cost of the fight. Thus, without a
change in the present law, the financial risk faced by insurgent
shareholders is likely to inhibit them from participating in proxy
contests.
II.

DEDUCTION OF PROXY FIGHT EXPENDITURES
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

Perhaps the most practical method by which an insurgent can
presently reduce the financial burden arising from a proxy contest
is to deduct his expenses from gross income under section 212 of the
Internal Revenue Code.4 Of course, section 212 deductions will
35 Friedman, supra note 9, at 959-62; Latcham & Emerson, supra note 4, at 15-17.
Contra, Phillips v. United Corp., 5 S.E.C. 758 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948).
36 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14(a) (1967).
37 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(a) (1964).
38 Friedman, supra note 9, at 960; Latcham & Emerson, supra note 4, at 16.
39
E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 14, at 516; see Emerson & Latcham,
supra note 14, at 435; Friedman, supra note 9, at 963.
40 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212, which states:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the production or collection of income;
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not of themselves make the financial resources of management and
insurgents equal, for management will have the advantage of conducting a proxy campaign limited only by the size of the corporate
treasury, which is likely to be considerably greater than the financial
resources of most individuals. However, such a deduction is likely
to provide more incentive for individual shareholders to challenge
management than presently exists.

A.

Present Status of the Law

Section 212 permits an individual to deduct expenses that are
"ordinary and necessary" and are incurred "for the production or
collection of income" or "for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income." These
requirements for deductibility indicate that section 212 is not intended to include all types of expenses, but the general rule fails to
describe precisely those expenditures that may be deducted. The
Supreme Court, in Welch v.Helvering,41 declared that a necessary
expense is one that is "appropriate and helpful." Concerning the
definition of an ordinary expenditure, the Court waxed eloquent
and imprecise:
Now, what is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of
constancy within it, is none the less a variable affected by time
and place and circumstance. Ordinary in this context does not
mean that the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense
that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit
affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime.
The counsel fees may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None
the less, the expense is an ordinary one because we know
from experience that payments for such a purpose, whether the
amount is large or small, are the common and accepted means of
defense against attack.... The situation is unique in the life of
the individual affected, but not in the life of the group, the community, of which he is a part. At such times there are norms of
conduct that help to stabilize our judgment, and make it certain
and objective. The instance is not erratic, but is brought within
a known type.
...Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the
decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One
struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready
touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of
(2)

for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income;
or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any

tax.

41290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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law; it is rather a way of42life. Life in all its fullness must supply
the answer to the riddle.

A Treasury regulation requires that "expenses must be reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation
to the production or collection of taxable income or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income" in order to be considered "ordinary and necessary"
and, therefore, deductible under section 212."3 While this definition of "ordinary and necessary" tends to execute the terms of section 212, its very general nature makes it difficult for a taxpayer
to use as a guide. Yet, a precise statement as to the distinction between a proximate relationship and a remote relationship is not
possible - "Life in all its fullness must supply the answer .... ""
Among the expenses that are specifically made deductible by
the regulation are investment counsel fees, custodial fees, fees for
clerical help, office rent, and "similar expenses" incurred "in connection with investments."45 Evidently, a proximate relationship
can be discerned between these expenses and the production of income, but, at least until recently,46 no such relationship could be
envisioned between insurgent proxy fight expenses and the production of income.
In addition, the courts have declared other expenses to be deductible, such as rental fees for safe-deposit boxes for stock certificates,4 7 fees for legal advice on protecting investments,4 8 litigation
42

1d. at 113-15.
43Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(d) (1957); see Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325
U.S. 365, 370 (1944), wherein the Court said "The requirement of § 23(a)(2) [now §
212] that deductible expenses be 'ordinary and necessary' implies that they must be reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the management of property held for the production of income."
44 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
45
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(g) (1957); see Elma M. Williams, 3 T.C. 200 (1944),
acquiesced in, 1944-2 CUM. BULL. 30 (annual fees paid to investment counsel); Frederick B. Rentschler, 1 T.C. 814 (1943) (clerical expense); cf. Merton E. Farr, 11 T.C.
552 (1948), aff'd sub nom. Sloane v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1951)
(explaining that the burden rests upon the taxpayer to demonstrate the propriety of
the deduction). See also Raymond Fitzgerald, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 56,280, at 1186
(1956), finding postage, telephone, and automobile expenses to be "similar expenses."
46
Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 7; Rev. Rul. 64-236, 1964-2
CUM. BULL. 64.
47 Daniel S.W. Kelley, 23 T.C. 682 (1955), acquiesced in, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 5,
aff'd, 228 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1956); W.N. Fry, 5 T.C. 1058 (1945), acquiesced in,
1954-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
48
Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945); Dykema v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1954); Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947),
acquiesced in, 1947 CUM. BULL. 1.
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expenses, " and travel expenses to oversee property.5" On the other
hand, payments to an investors' organization " and travel expenses
to attend shareholder meetings5" have been held to be nondeductible
because they are remote from the production of income.
Apparently, expenses arising from a shareholder's interest in a
corporation are deductible only if they directly relate to the physical
protection of the stock certificates and to determining the nature of
53
the taxpayer's investments. Prior to the recent revenue rulings,
discussed below, a shareholder's expenditure to influence his corporation and its activities was not deductible. If an expense must
first have exerted an influence on the corporation before the taxpayer's income was affected, it was deemed too remote from the
production of income or from the management, maintenance, or
conservation of income producing property to be a deductible expense.54 This standard, when applied to the deductibility of proxy
fight expenses, resulted in the denial of such deductions because
proxy contest expenditures would not of themselves produce income. In effect, a taxpayer could obtain a deduction for protecting
the paper representation of his interest in a business, but could not,
at least until the recent revenue rulings, obtain a deduction for seeking to protect the substance of his investment, the company, through
a proxy fight.
The Internal Revenue Service has issued two rulings regarding
the deductibility of proxy fight expenditures under sections 162(a)55
49 Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868
(1945); Stanley V. Waldheim, 25 T.C. 839, 852 (1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 1 (7th Cit.
1957); 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 16 T.C. 469, 477 (1951), affd, 195 F.2d 724 (2d
Cir. 1952).
50 R.C. Coffey, I T.C. 579, 588 (1943), acquiesced in, 1943 CuM. BULL. 5, aff'd,
141 F.2d 204 (5"th Cit. 1944); Paul H. Pazery, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 63,345, at 2063

(1964).
51
Bertie Charles Forbes, 18 T.C. 321 (1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953).
52
Rev. Rul. 56-511, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 170.
5
3 Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 7; Rev. Rul. 64-236, 1964-2
CuM. BULL. 64; see text accompanying note 46 supra.
54
Note, Proxy Fight Expenses: Probkms of Tax Deduction, 43 VA. L. REv. 891,
903 (1957).
55
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a), which states:
IN GENERAL - There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the
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and 212." These rulings were issued in response to, and in acquiescence to, several cases in which taxpayers succeeded in obtaining
favorable judicial holdings allowing the deduction of proxy fight
expenses.
The first of these cases was Surasky v. United States. 7 The tax.
payer purchased 4,000 of 6 million Montgomery-Ward shares fot
about $300,000 during 1954 and 1955, because he anticipated an
increase in the dividends and in the value of the stock through improvements in the financial condition of the company. In 1955,
the taxpayer and several other shareholders formed a committee to
seek important policy changes in Montgomery-Ward by replacing a
majority of the board of directors with supporters of the committee.
Thereafter, the committee commenced a proxy solicitation campaign
to achieve that end. The taxpayer contributed $17,000 to pay a
portion of the expenses of the fight and then deducted that sum on
his 1955 income tax return. The insurgents won three seats; their
chief targets, the president and the chairman of the board, resigned,
sales increased, dividends were increased by the board, a stock split
was declared, and the value of the stock rose after the conclusion of
the proxy battle. In 1956, the taxpayer sold his stock and realized
a capital gain of $50,000.58
The District Director disallowed the deduction of the contribution to the shareholders' committee, and the district court affirmed," 9
on the ground that the expectation of profit at the time of the expenditure was too speculative to establish a direct proximate relation
between the expenses and either the production of income or the
management of income producing property. When the taxpayer
made the contribution, "it was pure speculation whether he would
derive any monetary reward therefrom."6
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the $17,000 proxy fight
expenditure was deductible as an ordinary and necessary nonbusiness
circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business,
of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking
title or in which he has no equity.
56 Note 53 supra.
57 325 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1963), partially acquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 64-236, 1964
Cutm. BULL. 64, 65, noted in 42 TExAs L.REv. 558 (1964).
58 325 F.2d at 192-94.
59 62-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 5 9836, at 86,339 (M.D. Fla. 1962), rev'd, 325 F.2d 191
(5th Cir. 1963).
60 Id. at 86,340.
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expense under section 212. The court found that the trial court
construed Treasury Regulation 1.212-1(d) "to require much too
difficult a showing of proximate cause in the common-law tort concept than is required by the statute."61 Congress intended to allow
the deduction of "expenses genuinely incurred in the exercise of
reasonable business judgment in an effort to produce income that
may fall far short of satisfying the common-law definition of proximate cause.""2 The words "ordinary and necessary," therefore,
should be broadly construed in order to promote that purpose. The
taxpayer in Surasky made the payments in anticipation of the shareholder committee's activities, with a reasonable expectation of increased profits. The composition of the board of directors changed
as a result of the proxy fight and profits did increase. There was,
therefore, a sufficient connection between the expenditure and the
increase in income to warrant a deduction for the expenses incurred
in the proxy fight.
The Internal Revenue Service has stated that it will follow the
Surasky opinion, except "to the extent that the court in its opinion
indicates that to be deductible proxy fight expenses need not be
proximately related to production or collection of income or to management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income." 3 While this statement implies that Surasky
rejected the interpretation of "ordinary and necessary" in Regulation
1.212-1(d), the court explicitly stated that the validity of the Regulation was not under consideration.6" The court merely held, in
effect, that it was not necessary to show a direct proximate relationship between the expenditures and the increased dividends.
The Internal Revenue Service has also declared its willingness
to follow Graham v. Commissioner 5 in allowing proxy fight expenditures of insurgents as deductions. In Graham, the taxpayer
owned 40,000 of about 6 million shares in the New York Central
Railroad. In 1954, he joined with Alleghany Corporation and 14
other individuals to solicit proxies to unseat the board of directors.
The insurgents proposed to eliminate losses in the passenger department, to buy New York Central bonds then quoted at a discount,
and to modify certain important employment contracts. The insur61325 F.2d at 195.
02 Id.
63

Rev. Rul. 64-236, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 64, 65.
64 325 F.2d at 194-95.
6 5326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964), acquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 64-236, 1964-2 Ctm.
BULL. 64; see note 63 supra & accompanying text.
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gents emerged
victorious and the taxpayer became a director of the
66
company.
The following year the board reimbursed Alleghany, which had
advanced the funds for the proxy fight expenses to all the insurgents.
This action resulted in derivative suits by shareholders against the
taxpayer's group, which were subsequently compromised. The taxpayer paid his share of the compromise ($9,453) in 1957 and deducted that payment from his gross income. The deduction was
disallowed by the Commissioner. The Tax Court concurred on the
ground that the payment was not for the production or collection of
income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income, but was for the sole
purpose of becoming a director.67
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that the expenditure was not merely for the purpose of placing the
taxpayer on the board of directors."8 Through his participation in
the proxy fight, the taxpayer stood to profit as a shareholder greatly
in excess of his $2,400 salary as a director. In fact, the value of the
40,000 shares increased from $745,000 to $1,465,000 in 1957.
Thus, the proxy fight expenses were ordinary and necessary expenses
under section 212 because, "A stockholder's efforts to affect the
policies of his corporation through the exercise of his franchise is
the most logical and feasible if not the only method of managing,
e.g., conserving and maintaining, the income producing property
which he holds."6
These cases establish the view that a shareholder with a substantial number of shares, or whose shares together with the shares
of his allies are substantial in number, may deduct, under section
212, the expenses of a proxy fight, the purpose of which was either to increase the value of those shares or the taxpayer's income.
However, the connection between the expense and the production
of income must be compelling. If the shareholder is unlikely to
prevail in his fight, deduction of the expense will be disallowed.
Also, if it appears that a shareholder is unlikely to increase his income through a proxy fight, because his interest in the corporation
is minute, it is persuasive evidence that the battle does not relate
326 F.2d at 878-79.
R. Walker Graham, 40 T.C. 14, 23 (1963), rev'd, 326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964).
68 326 F.2d at 880.
69 Id.
66
67
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to, nor will it have any impact on the production of income; such
proxy fight expenses are nondeductible.
In allowing certain insurgents to deduct proxy contest expenses,
Surasky, Graham, and Revenue Ruling 64-236 have helped to reduce the financial burden on insurgents in a proxy fight. However,
an insurgent must show that the proxy fight was not part of a personal dispute with the company, that his motive was to increase the
company's production of income, and that he had a reasonable
chance of success - an unnecessarily difficult burden of proof."°
B.

Need for IncreasedAllowance of Deductions

The Treasury regulations do not limit deductions only to those
expenses which directly produce income, but also extend to expenses
incurred "for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income." The Supreme Court,
in Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner," has noted that expenses are
deductible if they "bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the
management of property held for the production of income,"7 2 and
this is true "even though the particular expense was not an expense
directly producing income."7
Hence, proxy fight expenditures should be deductible despite the
absence of a direct connection between the proxy fight and an increase in income, for a proxy fight can have an indirect influence on
the production of income. The increased possibility of a challenge
will tend to improve the quality of management's work, which in
turn should tend to improve the condition of the company and its
profitmaking. Also, the additional information concerning the company that becomes available during a proxy contest will help shareholders to make wiser and more profitable decisions concerning the
company and their own investments than would otherwise be possible. Thus, the benefits which arise from proxy contests may indirectly contribute to increasing the earnings of both the company and
the shareholders. But, even if the benefits arising from proxy contests are considered to be remote from the production of income,
they appear to involve the management of income producing property. Since the rights of shareholders encompass not only a proportionate right to receive dividends, -but also a right to assist in deter0

7 See Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).

71325 U.S. 365 (1944).
72Id. at 370.
73 Id. at 374.
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mining basic company policies and the composition of the board of
directors, expenditures which assist shareholders in exercising these
managerial rights, such as those arising from proxy contests, should
be deductible as expenses incurred in managing the corporation,
without regard to the motivation of those persons undertaking a
proxy solicitation.
Although a shareholder appears only to seek to harass the management, the above benefits derived either from a proxy fight or
the threat of one militate against the disallowance of a deduction
for such proxy fight expenses. However, at least two cases hold
to the contrary.
In the J.Raymond Dyer case,74 the taxpayer and his daughter
owned only 350 shares of Union Electric Company, which had more
than 10 million shares outstanding. The taxpayer conducted a oneman crusade to prevent the granting of proxies to the company's
management, but his deduction of $10,000 for expenses incurred in
this fight was disallowed. The Tax Court affirmed on the grounds
that the expenses were not sufficiently related to the taxpayer's stock
investment to warrant their deduction as expenditures incurred for
the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income.7 5 These expenditures were held to be personal in nature
and, therefore, not deductible.7
In another case,77 involving the deductibility of litigation and
other expenses of the same taxpayer and concerning a number of
proxy battles with the same company, the expenses were held nondeductible because the proxy battles were in reality personal struggles - "almost a vendetta.""8 Dyer's course of action as a shareholder over a period of several years in nine separate controversies
showed an intention to harass the company; no income producing
motive was apparent.
The Dyer cases are distinguishable from Surasky and Graham
because the Dyers had so small a stock interest that their efforts
alone could not possibly have been expected to change the company's policies.
In Surasky and Graham, the parties had substantial interests, at
74 36 T.C. 456 (1961), acquiescedin,
1962-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
75 Id. at 465.
76
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Dyer v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1965).
781d. at 952.
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least when combined with the shares of their allies, and had, therefore, a reasonable opportunity to bring about a change. Also, as
noted above, Dyer's expenses were not prompted by a concern for
the production of income, while in Surasky and Graham the expenses were incurred specifically for the purpose of financial gain.
The Dyer cases, therefore, are authority for disallowing a deduction
under section 212 by a small shareholder who incurs expenses in a
proxy fight over an issue that would not affect his dividend income
or stock value.
One recent revenue ruling 9 announced that the IRS would fol0
low Locke Manufacturing Companies v. United States."
In this
case, the corporation as the taxpayer sought to recover taxes paid
after the Commissioner had denied the deduction of some of the
company's proxy contest expenses as ordinary and necessary expenses
within the meaning of section 162(a),"1 which allows a deduction
for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." The court relied
on Welch v.Helvering,2 the intent of Congress to promote shareholder participation in the affairs of the corporation, and the expertise of the Securities and Exchange Commission to determine that the
proxy contest expenditures by the corporation were ordinary and
necessary and therefore deductible under section 162(a). In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted that:
The instant case presents a close analogy to the "once in a
lifetime" lawsuit referred to in Welch v. Helvering ...Just as it
was there recognized that the defense of an isolated lawsuit could
be an "ordinary" business expense, dearly today it is equally "ordinary" for a company in the course of its first or only proxy contest to incur considerable expenses for legal counsel, proxy solicitors and public relations experts in order to defend the policies
of its directors from attack by those who would oppose them."8 3
While the revenue ruling is appropriate, it perpetuates the socalled distinction between personal control proxy contests and policy
oriented proxy contests. The Internal Revenue Service "will con79

Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967 INT. REv. BULL. No. 10, at 7.
80 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964). Until this case there was no indication that a
corporation could not deduct management proxy fight expenses. 42 TEXAS L. REV.
558, 559 (1964). In view of the Surasky and Graham cases, the essence of which the
Internal Revenue Service agreed to accept, it is difficult to understand why the deduction in Locke was denied.
slSee note 55 supra.
82290 U.S. 111 (1933); see text accompanying note 41 supra.
83 Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80, 86-87 (D. Conn. 1964) (footnote omitted).
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tinue to scrutinize expenditures made by corporations in proxy contests to determine whether such expenditures are made primarily
for the benefit of the interests of individuals rather than in connection with questions of corporate policy."84 This distinction is
meaningless.8 5 It will require the Internal Revenue Service to
weigh each proxy contest to determine if the primary purpose of the
contest is to benefit the interests of individuals or to resolve questions of corporate policy. Inasmuch as the factors of self-interest
and corporate policy are often inextricably intermingled in a proxy
fight, the job of determining which factor predominates will be difficult. The benefits of a proxy fight, in terms of making the shareholders more knowledgeable about their corporation and improving
the performance of management, accrue regardless of the primary
orientation of the proxy fight. Also, the company's income producing prospects are improved by the better management that is likely
to result from the increased possibility of proxy fights. Thus, the
proviso in the Revenue Ruling was, perhaps, inadvisable. Indeed,
the Locke opinion pointed out that: "The distinction between 'policy' and 'personalities' is not always clear, nor is it particularly useful

.,,

86

III.

CONCLUSION

A shareholder considering whether or not to commence or actively participate in a proxy fight must realize that such contests are
quite expensive. He must also recognize that management has the
financial advantage, being able to charge the corporate treasury for
its proxy fight expenses if an issue of corporate policy is involved,
as it is in most proxy fights. Thus, so long as the corporation has
funds, management need not dip into its own resources to finance
a proxy solicitation. On the other hand, a shareholder seeking to
obtain approval of a policy or to oust management must often use
his own funds to pay expenses.
A victorious insurgent may have the corporation reimburse him,
but if he loses, the insurgent has no right to reimbursement. And,
if he is only partially successful or if the contest was only over a
proposal and not over control, he may be unable, from a practical
point of view, to obtain reimbursement.
Now, however, after Graham, Surasky, and Revenue Ruling
84

Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 7.

85 See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
86
Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80, 85 n.7 (D. Conn. 1964), citing
Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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64-236, a shareholder may deduct his proxy fight expenses if he engages in such a contest in order to produce income or manage, maintai, or conserve property held for the production of income. Such
a deduction will not equalize the insurgent's financial position vish-vis management, but it will be a step toward that goal. Of course,
the efficacy of the deduction of proxy fight expenses depends on
the taxpayer having sufficient income to cover 'those expenses.
In order to be entitled to deduct proxy contest expenses, the insurgent shareholder must take care not to involve himself in a proxy
fight which appears to be merely a personal dispute with management, and thus not for one of the purposes outlined in section 212.
He should also avoid those proxy fights in which he stands little
chance of winning; that is, if he is a small shareholder standing
alone against management, he cannot expect to deduct his proxy
fight expenses. Further, the shareholder must not only seek to increase or preserve his income, but must do so with a reasonable expectation of success. While a more liberal rule for deductions would
be preferable, even this relatively stringent standard will ease the
financial burden on many insurgents. With the assurance that his
expenses will be deductible, an insurgent now will be more willing
to oppose management on policy issues and for control. The result
will be a management more aware of the shareholders and shareholders more disposed to take an active part in the operation of the
corporation.
Section 212 should be broadly construed so that expenses arising from a proxy fight of any nature may be deducted. Such deductions will encourage and foster corporate democracy. And management, faced with the possibility of more frequent proxy battles, is
more likely to act in a more responsive, responsible, and efficient
manner in order to minimize the grievances of shareholders.

